Administrative Appeal Decision - Robinson, Draper (2020-02-10) by unknown
Fordham Law School 
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History 
Parole Administrative Appeal Decisions Parole Administrative Appeal Documents 
May 2021 
Administrative Appeal Decision - Robinson, Draper (2020-02-10) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad 
Recommended Citation 
"Administrative Appeal Decision - Robinson, Draper (2020-02-10)" (2021). Parole Information Project 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad/698 
This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Parole Administrative Appeal Documents 
at FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Parole 
Administrative Appeal Decisions by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of 




STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PARO LE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name:· Robinson, Draper Facility: Gowanda CF 
NY SID: 
DIN: 19-R-0563 
Appearances: Glenn R. Bruno, Esq. 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
11 Market Street, Suite 221 
P~m~~eepsie, NY 12601 
05-171-19 B 
. Decision appealed~ May 20 19· decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold to the 





Appellant's Brief received September 19,2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement'of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation R~port, Parole Board Rep~rt, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument 
Final De(rmi~!'.xsigned determine that the decision appealed is .hereby: 
/ ~liS . . 
; 
" ~ " . 
/-__/~ . _L. Affi~med . _ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to 
~ffirmed · _ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
/ 
Affirmed _Vacate~, remand.ed fo r de novo iri.terview _ Modified to . ----
. . 
. If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the AppealS Unlt's Findings and the separate findings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on. 2/JO(:;,oJ.D . 
Distribution: Appeals Unit -Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/20i 8) 
LIS 
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Appellant challenges the May 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing 
a hold to the M.E. date. The instant offense involved Appellant attempting to cause physical injury 
to a police officer during a struggle. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the Board regulations, 
which became effective July 30, 2014, do not satisfy Executive Law § 259-c(4) as amended; 2) 
the Board’s decision was unlawful, arbitrary and capricious because it was based solely on the nature 
of the instant offense without citing any aggravating factors; 3) the Board failed to consider all the 
relevant statutory factors including Appellant’s positive institutional accomplishments, release plans, 
and the required deprecation standard; 4) the Board overemphasized Appellant’s prior criminal 
record; 5) the determination is conclusory and does not adequately state the basis for the decision; 6) 
counsel was improperly denied access to records in that there are confidential sections of the Parole 
Board Report; 7) the Board acted as a sentencing judge and effectively imposed a sentence by holding 
Appellant to his M.E. date; 8) the hold to the M.E. date was excessive; 9) the Board was biased 
insofar as the panel was comprised of two members; and 10) the Board unlawfully abdicated its 
discretion and instead based its decision on an executive policy with respect to violent felons. 
These arguments are without merit. 
 
As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for 
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the 
Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the 
inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. 
Of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).  
 
While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is 
discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 
2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The 
Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of 
Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros 
v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).  In the absence 
of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be 
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presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 
680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 
A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 
157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 
128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
 
The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the 
appropriate factors, including: the instant offense of Attempted Assault in the second degree; 
Appellant’s criminal record including two prior state terms of incarceration, a federal sentence for 
a drug offense, and other sanctions for gang assault and weapons; Appellant’s institutional efforts 
including clean disciplinary record and program participation at the county jail; and release plans 
to live with his mother and go to school.  The Board also had before it and considered, among 
other things, letters of support, the sentencing minutes, and the COMPAS instrument. 
  
After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release 
would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its 
conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant offense, representing a continuation of 
Appellant’s criminal history. See Matter of Boccadisi v. Stanford, 133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 
477 (3d Dept. 2015); Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866 (3d Dept. 
2014); Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of 
Lashway v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of 
McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).  The 
Board also cited the COMPAS instrument’s elevated score for reentry substance abuse. See Matter 
of Espinal v. N.Y. State Bd. Of Parole, 172 A.D.3d 1816, 100 N.Y.S.3d 777 (3d Dept. 2019); 
Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Wade 
v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017). The Board encouraged Appellant 
to complete required programming and improve his relapse prevention plans. See Matter of Allen 
v. Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 1506, 78 N.Y.S.3d 445 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 32 N.Y.3d 903 
(2018); Matter of Barrett v. New York State Div. of Parole, 242 A.D.2d 763, 661 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d 
Dept. 1997); see also Matter of Connelly v. New York State Div. of Parole, 286 A.D.2d 792, 729 
N.Y.S.2d 808, 809 (3d Dept.), appeal dismissed 97 N.Y.2d 677, 738 N.Y.S.2d 291 (2001); Matter 
of Delrosario v. Stanford, 140 A.D.3d 1515, 34 N.Y.S.3d 696 (3d Dept. 2016). While the Board 
does not agree that aggravating factors are always necessary to support reliance on an inmate’s crime, 
Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, here the Board’s decision was based on 
the additional consideration of Appellant’s prior criminal history. 
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Appellant’s challenge to former 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3 (2014) – which is incorrect – is misplaced 
inasmuch as the regulation was repealed in 2017. The 2011 amendments require procedures 
incorporating risk and needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  
Executive Law § 259–c(4).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS 
instrument.  Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 
2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 
(3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 
N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 
386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  This is encompassed in the Board’s regulations.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 
8002.2(a).   However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole 
indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, 
including the statutory factors and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate 
the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the 
statutory factors including the instant offense.  The amendments also did not change the three 
substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole.  
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter 
of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is 
an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the 
purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied.  See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State 
Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes 
v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  That is exactly what occurred here.  
 
Inasmuch as Appellant contends the Board failed to consider requisite factors, there is a 
presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders.  See 
People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People 
ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d 
Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in 
fulfilling its obligations.  See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000).   
 
Appellant’s contention that the determination is conclusory and fails to adequately state the basis 
for the decision is likewise without merit. The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in 
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for 
the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 
82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 
435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 
(3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); 
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People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 
1983).   
 
As for access to confidential sections of the Parole Board Report, there was no impropriety as 
the Board may consider confidential information.  Matter of Molinar v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1214, 991 N.Y.S.2d 487 (3d Dept. 2014).  An inmate has no constitutional 
right to the information in his parole file, Billiteri v. U.S. Board of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944-945 
(2d Cir. 1976), and generally is not entitled to confidential material, Matter of Justice v. Comm’r 
of New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 130 A.D.3d 1342, 15 N.Y.S.3d 853 (3d Dept. 
2015); Matter of Perez v. New York State Div. of Parole, 294 A.D.2d 726, 741 N.Y.S.2d 753 (3d 
Dept. 2002); Matter of Macklin v. Travis, 274 A.D.2d 821, 711 N.Y.S.2d 915, 916 (3d Dept. 
2000).  
 
Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
 
A hold to the maximum expiration date is permissible.  See Matter of Abreu v. Stanford, 153 
A.D.3d 1455, 61 N.Y.S.3d 706 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Rodriguez v. New York State Dep’t of 
Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 141 A.D.3d 903, 904, 35 N.Y.S.3d 569, 570–71 (3d Dept. 2016); 
Matter Davis v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 81 A.D.3d 1020, 1021, 915 N.Y.S.2d 771 (3d Dept. 
2011); Matter of Swinson v. Warden, 75 A.D.3d 433, 434, 903 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1st Dept. 2010). 
 
 There is nothing inherently improper about a two-member panel, which is authorized by law.  
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.1(b).  Inasmuch as Appellant asserts bias, there 
must be support in the record to prove an alleged bias and proof that the decision flowed from such 
bias.  Matter of Hernandez v. McSherry, 271 A.D.2d 777, 706 N.Y.S.2d 647 (3d Dept. 2000), lv. 
denied, 95 N.Y.2d 769, 722 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2000).  Here, there is no such proof.  Moreover, because 
Appellant failed to raise an objection to the complained of fact at the parole interview, this claim 
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has not been preserved.  Matter of Morrison v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1073, 916 N.Y.S.2d 655 (3d 
Dept. 2011); Matter of Vanier v. Travis, 274 A.D.2d 797, 711 N.Y.S.2d 920 (3d Dept. 2000).    
 
Finally, there is no merit to the apparent claim that the decision was predetermined based on an 
alleged executive policy to deny parole to violent felony offenders.  Allegations that the Board has 
systematically denied parole to prisoners convicted of violent crimes have been dismissed 
repeatedly by the Courts.  See, e.g., Matter of Cartagena v. Alexander, 64 A.D.3d 841, 882 N.Y.S.2d 
735 (3d Dept.  2009); Matter of Motti v. Dennison, 38 A.D.3d 1030, 831 N.Y.S.2d 298 (3d Dept. 
2008); Matter of Cardenales v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 371, 830 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1st Dept. 2007); 
Matter of Wood v. Dennison, 25 A.D.3d 1056, 1057, 807 N.Y.S.2d 480, 481 (3d Dept. 2006); 
Matter of Ameyda v. Travis, 21 A.D.3d 1200, 800 N.Y.S.2d (3d Dept. 2005), lv. denied, 6 N.Y.3d 
703, 811 N.Y.S.2d 335 (2006); Matter of Bottom v. Travis, 5 A.D.3d 1027, 773 N.Y.S.2d 717 (4th 
Dept.), appeal dismissed 2 N.Y.3d 822, 781 N.Y.S.2d 285 (2004). 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
